

CPSC 540: Machine Learning

Bayesian Statistics

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Motivation: Controlling Complexity

- For many structured prediction tasks, we need **very complicated models**.
 - We require multiple forms of regularization to prevent overfitting.
- In 340 we saw two ways to **reduce complexity** of a model:
 - **Model averaging** (ensemble methods).
 - **Regularization** (linear models).
- **Bayesian** methods **combine both of these**.
 - Average over models, weighted by posterior (which includes regularizer).
 - Allows you to fit **extremely-complicated models without overfitting**.

Current Hot Topics in Machine Learning



Bayesian learning includes:

- Gaussian processes.
- Approximate inference.
- Bayesian nonparametrics.

Why Bayesian Learning?

- Standard L2-regularized logistic regression step:
 - Given **finite** dataset containing **IID** samples.
 - E.g., samples (x^i, y^i) with $x^i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and $y^i \in \{-1, 1\}$.
 - Find “best” w by **minimizing NLL** with a regularizer to “prevent overfitting”.

$$\hat{w} \in \underset{w}{\operatorname{argmin}} - \sum_{i=1}^n \log p(y^i | x^i, w) + \frac{\lambda}{2} \|w\|^2.$$

- **Predict labels** of *new* example \tilde{x} using **single weights** \hat{w} ,

$$\hat{y} = \operatorname{sgn}(\hat{w}^T \tilde{x}).$$

- But data was random, so **weight** \hat{w} is a **random variables**.
 - This might put our trust in a \hat{w} where **posterior** $p(\hat{w} | X, y)$ is **tiny**.
- **Bayesian approach**: “all parameters are nuisance parameters”.
 - Treat w as random and predict based on rules of probability.

Problems with MAP Estimation

- Does MAP make the right decision?
 - Consider three hypotheses $\mathcal{H} = \{\text{"lands"}, \text{"crashes"}, \text{"explodes"}\}$ with posteriors:

$$p(\text{"lands"} \mid D) = 0.4, \quad p(\text{"crashes"} \mid D) = 0.3, \quad p(\text{"explodes"} \mid D) = 0.3.$$

- The MAP estimate is "plane lands", with posterior probability 0.4.
 - But **probability of dying is 0.6**.
 - If we want to live, MAP estimate doesn't give us what we should do.
- **Bayesian approach considers all models**: says don't take plane.
- **Bayesian decision theory**: accounts for **costs** of different errors.

MAP vs. Bayes

- MAP (regularized optimization) approach **maximizes over w** :

$$\hat{w} \in \operatorname{argmax}_w p(w | X, y)$$

$$\equiv \operatorname{argmax}_w p(y | X, w)p(w) \quad (\text{Bayes' rule, } w \perp X)$$

$$\hat{y} \in \operatorname{argmax}_y p(y | \tilde{x}, \hat{w}).$$

- **Bayesian** approach predicts by **integrating over possible w** :

$$p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, X, y) = \int_w p(\tilde{y}, w | \tilde{x}, X, y)dw \quad \text{marginalization rule}$$

$$= \int_w p(\tilde{y} | w, \tilde{x}, X, y)p(w | \tilde{x}, X, y)dw \quad \text{product rule}$$

$$= \int_w p(\tilde{y} | w, \tilde{x})p(w | X, y)dw \quad \tilde{y} \perp X, y | \tilde{x}, w$$

- Considers all possible w , and **weights prediction by posterior for w** .

Motivation for Bayesian Learning

- Motivation for studying Bayesian learning:
 - ① **Optimal decisions** using rules of probability (and possibly error costs).
 - ② Gives estimates of **variability/confidence**.
 - E.g., this gene has a 70% chance of being relevant.
 - ③ Elegant approaches for **model selection** and **model averaging**.
 - E.g., optimize λ or optimize grouping of w elements.
 - ④ Easy to **relax IID assumption**.
 - E.g., hierarchical Bayesian models for data from different sources.
 - ⑤ **Bayesian optimization**: fastest rates for some non-convex problems.
 - ⑥ Allows models with **unknown/infinite number of parameters**.
 - E.g., number of clusters or number of states in hidden Markov model.
- Why isn't everyone using this?
 - Philosophical: Some people don't like **"subjective" prior**.
 - Computational: Typically leads to nasty **integration** problems.

Coin Flipping Example: MAP Approach

- MAP vs. Bayesian for a simple **coin flipping** scenario:

- ① Our **likelihood** is a Bernoulli,

$$p(H | \theta) = \theta.$$

- ② Our **prior** assumes that we are in one of two scenarios:

- The coin has a 50% chance of being fair ($\theta = 0.5$).
- The coin has a 50% chance of being rigged ($\theta = 1$).

- ③ Our **data** consists of **three consecutive heads**: 'HHH'.

- What is the probability that the **next toss is a head**?

- **MAP** estimate is $\hat{\theta} = 1$, since $p(\theta = 1 | HHH) > p(\theta = 0.5 | HHH)$.

- So MAP says the probability is 1.

- But MAP overfits: we believed there was a **50% chance the coin is fair**.

Coin Flipping Example: Posterior Distribution

- Bayesian method needs **posterior** probability over θ ,

$$p(\theta = 1 | HHH) = \frac{p(HHH | \theta = 1)p(\theta = 1)}{p(HHH)} \quad (\text{Bayes rule})$$

$$\begin{aligned} (\text{marg and prod rule}) &= \frac{p(HHH | \theta = 1)p(\theta = 1)}{p(HHH | \theta = 0.5)p(\theta = 0.5) + p(HHH | \theta = 1)p(\theta = 1)} \\ &= \frac{(1)(0.5)}{(1/8)(0.5) + (1)(0.5)} = \frac{8}{9}, \end{aligned}$$

and similarly we have $p(\theta = 0.5 | HHH) = \frac{1}{9}$.

- So given the data, we should **believe with probability $\frac{8}{9}$ that coin is rigged.**
 - There is still a $\frac{1}{9}$ probability that it is fair that **MAP is ignoring.**

Coin Flipping Example: Posterior Predictive

- **Posterior predictive** gives probability of head given data and prior,

$$\begin{aligned} p(H | HHH) &= p(H, \theta = 1 | HHH) + p(H, \theta = 0.5 | HHH) \\ &= p(H | \theta = 1, HHH)p(\theta = 1 | HHH) \\ &\quad + p(H | \theta = 0.5, HHH)p(\theta = 0.5 | HHH) \\ &= (1)(8/9) + (0.5)(1/9) = 0.94. \end{aligned}$$

- So the correct probability given our assumptions/data is 0.94, and not 1.
 - Though with a different prior we would get a different answer.
- Notice that there was **no optimization** of the parameter θ :
 - In Bayesian stats we **condition on data** and **integrate over unknowns**.
- In Bayesian stats/ML: “**all parameters are nuisance parameters**”.

Coin Flipping Example: Discussion

Comments on coin flipping example:

- Bayesian prediction uses that HHH could come from fair coin.
- As we see more heads, posterior converges to 1.
 - MLE/MAP/Bayes usually agree as data size increases.
- If we ever see a tail, posterior of $\theta = 1$ becomes 0.

- If the prior is correct, then Bayesian estimate is optimal:
 - Bayesian decision theory gives optimal action incorporating costs.
- If the prior is incorrect, Bayesian estimate may be worse.
 - This is where people get uncomfortable about “subjective” priors.

- But MLE/MAP are also based on “subjective” assumptions.

Bayesian Model Averaging

- In 340 we saw that **model averaging** can improve performance.
 - E.g., random forests average over random trees that overfit.
- But should all models get equal weight?
 - What if we find a **random decision stump that fits the data perfectly**?
 - Should this get the same weight as deep random trees that likely overfit?
 - In science, research may be fraudulent or not based on evidence.
 - Should “vaccines cause autism” or “climate change denial” models get equal weight?
- In these cases, naive **averaging may do worse**.

Bayesian Model Averaging

- Suppose we have a set of m probabilistic classifiers w_j
 - Previously our ensemble method gave all models equal weights,

$$p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}) = \frac{1}{m}p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, w_1) + \frac{1}{m}p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, w_2) + \cdots + \frac{1}{m}p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, w_m).$$

- Bayesian model averaging (following rules of probability) weights by posterior,

$$p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}) = p(w_1 | X, y)p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, w_1) + p(w_2 | X, y)p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, w_2) + \cdots + p(w_m | X, y)p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, w_m).$$

- So we should weight by probability that w_j is the correct model.
 - Equal weights assume all models are equally probable and fit data equally well.

Bayesian Model Averaging

- Weights are posterior, so proportional to likelihood times prior:

$$p(w_j | X, y) \propto \underbrace{p(y | X, w_j)}_{\text{likelihood}} \underbrace{p(w_j)}_{\text{prior}}.$$

- Likelihood gives more weight to models that predict y well.
- Prior should give less weight to models that are likely to overfit.
- This is how rules of probability say we should weight models.
 - It's annoying that it requires a "prior" belief over models.
 - But as $n \rightarrow \infty$, all weight goes to "correct" model[s] w^* as long as $p(w^*) > 0$.

Bayes for Density Estimation and Generative/Discriminative

- We can use Bayesian approach for **density estimation**:
 - With data D and parameters θ we have:
 - 1 Likelihood $p(D | \theta)$.
 - 2 Prior $p(\theta)$.
 - 3 Posterior $p(\theta | D)$.

- We can use Bayesian approach for **supervised learning**:
 - **Generative** approach (naive Bayes, GDA) are density estimation on X and y :
 - 1 Likelihood $p(y, X | w)$.
 - 2 Prior $p(w)$.
 - 3 Posterior $p(w | X, y)$.

 - **Discriminative** approach (logistic regression, neural nets) just conditions on X :
 - 1 Likelihood $p(y | X, w)$.
 - 2 Prior $p(w)$.
 - 3 Posterior $p(w | X, y)$.

7 Ingredients of Bayesian Inference (MEMORIZE)

- ① **Likelihood** $p(y | X, w)$.
 - Probability of **seeing data given parameters**.
- ② **Prior** $p(w | \lambda)$.
 - Belief that parameters are correct **before we've seen data**.
- ③ **Posterior** $p(w | X, y, \lambda)$.
 - Probability that parameters are correct **after we've seen data**.
 - We won't use the MAP "point estimate", we want the **whole distribution**.
- ④ **Predictive** $p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, w)$.
 - Probability of **test label \tilde{y} given parameters w** and test features \tilde{x} .
 - For example, sigmoid function for logistic regression.

7 Ingredients of Bayesian Inference (MEMORIZE)

- 5 Posterior predictive $p(\tilde{y} | \tilde{x}, X, y, \lambda)$.
 - Probability of new data given old, integrating over parameters.
 - This tells us which prediction is most likely given data and prior.
- 6 Marginal likelihood $p(y | X, \lambda)$ (also called “evidence”).
 - Probability of seeing data given hyper-parameters (integrating over parameters).
 - We'll use this later for hypothesis testing and setting hyper-parameters.
- 7 Cost $C(\hat{y} | \tilde{y})$.
 - The penalty you pay for predicting \hat{y} when it was really was \tilde{y} .
 - Leads to Bayesian decision theory: predict to minimize expected cost.

Review: Decision Theory

- Are we **equally concerned about “spam” vs. “not spam”**.

- Consider a scenario where **different predictions have different costs**:

Predict / True	True “spam”	True “not spam”
Predict “spam”	0	100
Predict “not spam”	10	0

- In 340 we discussed predicting \hat{y} given \hat{w} by **minimizing expected cost**:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[\text{Cost}(\hat{y} = \text{“spam”})] &= p(\tilde{y} = \text{“spam”} \mid \tilde{x}, \hat{w})C(\hat{y} = \text{“spam”} \mid \tilde{y} = \text{“spam”}) \\ &\quad + p(\tilde{y} = \text{“not spam”} \mid \tilde{x}, \hat{w})C(\hat{y} = \text{“spam”} \mid \tilde{y} = \text{“not spam”}).\end{aligned}$$

- Consider a case where $p(\tilde{y} = \text{“spam”} \mid \tilde{x}, \hat{w}) > p(\tilde{y} = \text{“not spam”} \mid \tilde{x}, \hat{w})$.
 - We might still **predict “not spam” if expected cost is lower**.

Bayesian Decision Theory

- Bayesian decision theory:

- Instead of using a MAP estimate \hat{w} , we should use **posterior predictive**,

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Cost}(\hat{y} = \text{"spam"})] = p(\tilde{y} = \text{"spam"} \mid \tilde{x}, X, y)C(\hat{y} = \text{"spam"} \mid \tilde{y} = \text{"spam"}) \\ + p(\tilde{y} = \text{"not spam"} \mid \tilde{x}, X, y)C(\hat{y} = \text{"spam"} \mid \tilde{y} = \text{"not spam"}).$$

- Minimizing this expected cost is the **optimal action**.

- Note that there is a lot going on here:

- **Expected cost** depends on **cost** and **posterior predictive**.
- **Posterior predictive** depends on **predictive** and **posterior**
- **Posterior** depends on **likelihood** and **prior**.

Summary

- Bayesian statistics:
 - Condition on the data, integrate (rather than maximize) over posterior.
 - “All parameters are nuisance parameters”.
- Bayesian model averaging and decision theory:
 - Model averaging and decision theory based on rules of probability.
- Next time: learning the prior?