Advanced Topics in Behavioral Game Theory II

Modeling Strategic Behavior as a Machine Learning Problem

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Modeling Strategic Behavior as a Machine Learning Problem: Advanced Topics in BGT II: Leyton-Brown & Wright (1)

Lecture Overview

Explaining anomalies using loss aversion

Modeling Strategic Behavior as a Machine Learning Problem: Advanced Topics in BGT II: Leyton-Brown & Wright (2)

Risk aversion

Definition

An agent is **risk averse** if they strictly prefer a "sure thing" to a risky prospect with a higher expected value (so long as it isn't too much higher).

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Example

From your current wealth level, would you prefer:

A \$0 for sure

B A 50-50 chance of losing \$100 or gaining \$110

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Risk aversion as concave utility



- A concave utility for money models decreasing marginal value for money
- An agent with concave u_i is said to be **risk averse**, because they will **strictly prefer** to receive a fair lottery's expected value than to play the lottery.

Relative Risk Aversion

• Risk aversion of *u* at *x* can be measured by **relative risk aversion**:

$$R(x) = \frac{-xu''(x)}{u'(x)}$$

- Common assumption: Constant relative risk aversion utility (CRRA)
- i.e., $R(x) = \rho$ for all x, constant ρ
- Can experimentally measure ρ (how?)

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- Can experimentally measure ρ (how?)
- Estimates are usually around **1.0**

Equity premium puzzle

- Equity premium: Equities (e.g., stocks) typically have a higher return than fixed income securities (i.e., bonds)
- Usual explanation: Risk aversion!
 - Stocks have variable returns
 - Risk averse investor will only buy stocks if their average returns are (enough) greater than bonds
- Between 1926 and 1995: Average real returns on stocks: 7%, vs. 1% for bonds

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- Between 1926 and 1995: Average real returns on stocks: 7%, vs. 1% for bonds
- Equity premium puzzle: To explain the historical equity premium, investors would need to have risk aversion greater than **30**

Prospect theory [Kahneman & Tversky, 1979]

- Utility theory: The only thing that matters is the (distribution over the) **final outcome**
- Prospect theory: The only thing that matters is the (distribution over the) **changes in outcome** from current situation
 - i.e., the relevant quantities are gains versus losses

Loss aversion

Definition

An agent who exhibits **loss aversion** is more sensitive to a given loss of x from their **current** wealth level than they are to a gain of x.

E.g., the following prospect-theoretic value function exhibits (linear) loss aversion:

$$v(\delta x) = \begin{cases} \delta x & \text{if } \delta x \ge 0, \\ 2.5\delta x & \text{if } \delta x < 0. \end{cases}$$

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- Loss aversion is a very robust experimental finding
 - People are typically twice as averse to losses as attracted by gains
- A loss averse agent will likely turn down a 50-50 bet between —\$100 vs \$190, but will accept 100 such bets pooled together (**why?**)

"Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle" [Benartzi & Thaler, 1995]

- Equity premium implies unrealistically-large risk aversion
- Model implication: What degree of loss aversion could explain the equity premium?
 - Simulation study to estimate loss averse values for different portfolios
 - What values of loss aversion yield indifference between bonds and stocks?
- Evaluation of loss averse values depends on aggregation period (**why?**)
- If investors evaluate portfolios annually, implies loss aversion of roughly 2 (previous experimental estimates)

Summary

- 1. Examples of how to extend BGT models to more complex settings
 - Extensive form games
 - Bayesian games
- 2. Examples of additional assumptions that can be relaxed
 - Specific decision procedure
 - Utility of outcomes vs. value of changes
- 3. Examples of different kinds of questions BGT can bear on
 - Normative, reasons that specific models have desirable properties
 - Descriptive, predictions of decisions
 - Explanation of anomalies, implications of models