## Extensive Form Games

#### CPSC 532A Lecture 9

October 10, 2006

Extensive Form Games

CPSC 532A Lecture 9, Slide 1

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### Lecture Overview

#### Recap

#### Perfect-Information Extensive-Form Games

Subgame Perfection



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**Extensive Form Games** 

### Formal definition

- $(\Omega, \pi)$  is a finite probability space
- for every agent *i*, divide  $\Omega$  into a set of partitions  $\mathbf{P_i} = \{P_{i,1}, \dots, P_{i,k_i}\}$ 
  - ► For all i,  $\bigcup_{j=1}^{k_i} P_{i,j} = \Omega$  and  $j \neq j'$  implies that  $P_{i,j} \cap P_{i,j'} = \emptyset$ .
  - We'll use the partitions to indicate values of Ω that are indistinguishable for i.
- (Pure) strategy:  $\sigma_i: \Omega \to A_i$ 
  - ► To capture our intuition about the partitions, we need the property that  $(\omega, \omega' \in \mathbf{P}_i)$  implies that  $\sigma_i(\omega) = \sigma_i(\omega')$

#### Definition

 $(\Omega,\pi,\mathcal{P},\sigma)\text{, is a correlated equilibrium when }$ 

$$\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \pi(\omega) u_i\left(\sigma_i(\omega), \sigma_{-i}(\omega)\right) \ge \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \pi(\omega) u_i\left(\sigma'_i(\omega), \sigma_{-i}(\omega)\right).$$

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#### Other remarks

- For every Nash equilibrium σ\* of a game G = (N, A, u) there exists a correlated equilibrium (Ω, π, P, σ) under which each agent i ∈ N plays each action a ∈ A<sub>i</sub> with probability σ<sup>\*</sup><sub>i</sub>(a).
- Not every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium
  - thus, correlated equilibrium is a weaker notion than Nash
- Any convex combination of the payoffs achievable under correlated equilibria is itself realizable under a correlated equilibrium

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# Computing CE

$$\sum_{\substack{a \in A \mid a_i \in a}} p(a)u_i(a) \ge \sum_{\substack{a \in A \mid a'_i \in a}} p(a)u_i(a'_i, a_{-i}) \quad \forall i \in N, \, \forall a_i, a'_i \in A_i$$

$$p(a) \ge 0 \qquad \qquad \forall a \in A$$

$$\sum_{a \in A} p(a) = 1$$

• variables: p(a); constants:  $u_i(a)$ 

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# Computing CE

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$$p(a) \ge 0 \qquad \qquad \forall a \in A$$

$$\sum_{\substack{a \in A}} p(a) = 1$$

- variables: p(a); constants:  $u_i(a)$
- we could find the social-welfare maximizing CE by adding an objective function

maximize: 
$$\sum_{a \in A} p(a) \sum_{i \in N} u_i(a).$$

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Subgame Perfection

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#### Introduction

- The normal form game representation does not incorporate any notion of sequence, or time, of the actions of the players
- The extensive form is an alternative representation that makes the temporal structure explicit.
- Two variants:
  - perfect information extensive-form games
  - imperfect-information extensive-form games

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### Definition

A (finite) perfect-information game (in extensive form) is a tuple  $G=(N,A,H,Z,\chi,\rho,\sigma,u)$ , where

- N is a set of n players
- $A = (A_1, \ldots, A_n)$  is a set of actions for each player
- H is a set of non-terminal choice nodes
- Z is a set of terminal nodes, disjoint from H
- $\chi: H \to 2^A$  is the action function
  - assigns to each choice node a set of possible actions
- $\rho: H \to N$  is the player function
  - $\blacktriangleright$  assigns to each non-terminal node a player  $i \in N$  who chooses an action at that node


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  - $\blacktriangleright$  assigns to each non-terminal node a player  $i \in N$  who chooses an action at that node
- $\sigma: H \times A \rightarrow H \cup Z$  is the successor function
  - maps a choice node and an action to a new choice node or terminal node such that for all  $h_1, h_2 \in H$  and  $a_1, a_2 \in A$ , if  $\sigma(h_1, a_1) = \sigma(h_2, a_2)$  then  $h_1 = h_2$  and  $a_1 = a_2$
- ▶  $u = (u_1, ..., u_n)$ , where  $u_i : Z \to \mathbb{R}$  is a utility function for player i on the terminal nodes Z


Note: the choice nodes form a tree, so we can identify a node with its history.

## Example: the sharing game



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## Example: the sharing game



only once.)

### **Pure Strategies**

In the sharing game (splitting 2 coins) how many pure strategies does each player have?

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## **Pure Strategies**

- In the sharing game (splitting 2 coins) how many pure strategies does each player have?
  - player 1: 3; player 2: 8

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### Pure Strategies


- In the sharing game (splitting 2 coins) how many pure strategies does each player have?
  - player 1: 3; player 2: 8
- Overall, a pure strategy for a player in a perfect-information game is a complete specification of which deterministic action to take at every node belonging to that player.

#### Definition

Let  $G=(N,A,H,Z,\chi,\rho,\sigma,u)$  be a perfect-information extensive-form game. Then the pure strategies of player i consist of the cross product


$$\underset{h \in H, \rho(h)=i}{\times} \chi(h)$$

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
What are the pure strategies for player 2?






What are the pure strategies for player 2?

•  $S_2 = \{(C, E); (C, F); (D, E); (D, F)\}$ 



What are the pure strategies for player 2? •  $S_2 = \{(C, E); (C, F); (D, E); (D, F)\}$ What are the pure strategies for player 1?



What are the pure strategies for player 2?

• 
$$S_2 = \{(C, E); (C, F); (D, E); (D, F)\}$$

What are the pure strategies for player 1?

• 
$$S_1 = \{(B,G); (B,H), (A,G), (A,H)\}$$

► This is true even though, conditional on taking A, the choice between G and H will never have to be made.

**Extensive Form Games** 

# Nash Equilibria

Given our new definition of pure strategy, we are able to reuse our old definitions of:


- mixed strategies
- best response
- Nash equilibrium

#### Theorem

*Every perfect information game in extensive form has a PSNE* This is easy to see, since the players move sequentially.


In fact, the connection to the normal form is even tighter we can "convert" an extensive-form game into normal form 1 В Α 2 С D Е (3,8)(8,3)(5,5)G Η (2,10)(1,0)

In fact, the connection to the normal form is even tighter we can "convert" an extensive-form game into normal form



	CE	CF	DE	DF
AG	3,8	3, 8	8,3	8,3
AH	3,8	3, 8	8,3	8,3
BG	5, 5	2, 10	5, 5	2, 10
BH	5, 5	1, 0	5, 5	1, 0

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


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	-			

this illustrates the lack of compactness of the normal form

- games aren't always this small
- even here we write down 16 payoff pairs instead of 5

- In fact, the connection to the normal form is even tighter
  - we can "convert" an extensive-form game into normal form



- while we can write any extensive-form game as a NF, we can't do the reverse.
  - e.g., matching pennies cannot be written as a perfect-information extensive form game

1, 0

DF

8,3

8,3


2,10

1, 0

## Induced Normal Form

► In fact, the connection to the normal form is even tighter


we can "convert" an extensive-form game into normal form



What are the (three) pure-strategy equilibria?

► In fact, the connection to the normal form is even tighter

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	CE	CF	DE	DF
AG	3,8	3,8	8,3	8,3
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
$$(A,G), (C,F)$$

$$(A, H), (C, F)$$

 $\bullet (B,H), (C,E)$ 

► In fact, the connection to the normal form is even tighter

we can "convert" an extensive-form game into normal form



	CE	CF	DE	DF
AG	3,8	3,8	8,3	8,3
AH	3,8	3, 8	8,3	8,3
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What are the (three) pure-strategy equilibria?

$$(A,G), (C,F)$$

$$(A, H), (C, F)$$

 $\bullet (B,H), (C,E)$ 

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Subgame Perfection


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
**Extensive Form Games** 

## Subgame Perfection



- ► There's something intuitively wrong with the equilibrium (B, H), (C, E)
  - Why would player 1 ever choose to play H if he got to the second choice node?
    - After all, G dominates H for him

# Subgame Perfection




- ► There's something intuitively wrong with the equilibrium (B, H), (C, E)
  - Why would player 1 ever choose to play H if he got to the second choice node?
    - After all, G dominates H for him
  - He does it to threaten player 2, to prevent him from choosing *F*, and so gets 5
    - However, this seems like a non-credible threat
    - If player 1 reached his second decision node, would he really follow through and play H?

#### Formal Definition

- Define subgame of G rooted at h:
  - the restriction of G to the descendents of H.
- ► Define set of subgames of G:
  - subgames of G rooted at nodes in G

- ▶ s is a subgame perfect equilibrium of G iff for any subgame G' of G, the restriction of s to G' is a Nash equilibrium of G'
- Notes:
  - ▶ since G is its own subgame, every SPE is a NE.
  - this definition rules out "non-credible threats"

#### Back to the Example




Which equilibria from the example are subgame perfect?

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#### Back to the Example



- ▶ Which equilibria from the example are subgame perfect?
  - (A,G), (C,F) is subgame perfect
  - (B, H) is an non-credible threat, so (B, H), (C, E) is not subgame perfect
  - (A, H) is also non-credible, even though H is "off-path"