__Multiagent Systems:
Course Reader Errata__

·
**p. 105** It states that every behavioural strategy is also a
mixed strategy. This is not true in general, as example on p. 106 shows. In
general, for games of imperfect recall, there may exist mixed strategies that
are not equivalent to any behavioural strategies, and vice versa, behavioural
strategies not equivalent to any mixed strategy. That cannot happen in games of
perfect recall.

·
**p. 107** In the last paragraph, it should read "R dominates
C", instead of "L dominates C". Also, it should read "player 1 should go R"
instead of "player 1 should go D".

·
**p. 111** The statement of the folk theorem is slightly wrong.
The "only if" direction is fine. The "if" direction should be supplemented with:
"(r_{1},r_{2}) is a feasible payoff profile of G". A feasible
payoff profile is a rational convex combination of *outcome payoffs* of G
(That is a linear combination where coefficients are rational, non-negative, and
sum to 1). Note that (r_{1},r_{2}) is *not necessarily* a
payoff profile of any strategy profile of G. Also, the folk theorem is not
restricted to 2-player games. See handout #7 for the proof.

·
**p. 112** Definition 3.5.3 should read "A *Markov*
strategy...". Conversely, definition 3.5.4 should read "A *stationary*
strategy s_{i} is a Markov strategy...".

·
**p. 150** In the definition 5.1.3 of monotonic function, the
part "(but leaving the orderings otherwise unchanged)" should not be there. All
that matters for the condition of monotonicity is that o only moves up in
preferences.

·
**p. 150** Below Muller-Satterthwaite theorem, the sentence
"This means it must not be non-monotonic" should read "This means it *must*
be non-monotonic".