

ESSENTIALS OF GAME THEORY

A Concise Multidisciplinary Introduction

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Draft of May 10, 2008

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To my parents Anne and David Leyton-Brown... —KLB

To my parents Leila and Havis Stein... —YS

...with much love and thanks for all that you have taught us.

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