

DUALS OF INTUITIONISTIC TABLEAUS

by

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ABSTRACT

We present a dual version of the intuitionistic Beth tableaux with signed formulas introduced in Fitting [9] proving their correctness and completeness with respect to Kripke models.

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1. INTRODUCTION.

In introducing the sequent calculi LK for classical first order logic and LJ for intuitionistic first order logic, Gentzen [1] noted the importance of duality and symmetry of the calculus LK. Concerning symmetry Gentzen wrote: " This is made possible by the admission of sequents with several formulae in the succedent....The symmetry thus obtained is more suitable to classical logic. On the other hand the restriction to at most one formula in the succedent will be retained for the intuitionistic calculus LJ." (page 86 of the English translation edited by M.E.Szabo).

The tableaux method in proof theory, first introduced by Beth [2] and Hintikka [3], ultimately derive from the Gentzen sequent calculus, as Smullyan acknowledges (page 15 of [4]) in defining his analytic tableaux. In addition, Gentzen's observations about LK, together with the well known dual properties of first order classical logic, led to the introduction of dual tableaux, see for example the duals of Smullyan tableaux, (elsewhere called positive analytic tableaux) defined in [5].

Turning to intuitionistic first order logic as formalized by Heyting [6], it does not seem that the dual properties of this formal system have been investigated. It should be noticed however that the restriction to only one formula in the succedent of a sequent in the calculus LJ was in many cases unnecessary, see Leblanc and Thomason [7].

After the introduction of Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic [8], Fitting [9] introduced intuitionistic tableaux with signed formulas, proving completeness of this method of proof with respect to Kripke models. Then Smullyan [10] showed how the completeness theorem for intuitionistic logic, as well as for S_4 -Modal logic, can be obtained as a special case of the completeness theorem of classical frame-works.

With such powerful instruments at our disposal it is easy to show that Beth intuitionistic tableaux have duals and to prove their completeness with respect to Kripke models.

2. KRIPKE MODELS AND POSITIVE INTUITIONISTIC TABLEAUS.

Before introducing Kripke models we require some definitions.

Let \mathcal{S} be a countable, non-empty set of parameters: a, b, c, \dots ; and let \mathcal{D} be a countable set of predicate letters A_1, A_2, \dots . An atomic formula from \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{D} is an expression of the type $A(k_1, k_2, \dots, k_n)$ where A is an n -place predicate letter in \mathcal{D} and for each $1 \leq i \leq n$ k_i is an element of \mathcal{S} .

A classical model for \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{D} is any complete and consistent set of atomic formulas. Formulas from \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{D} are built in the usual way from atomic formulas using the connectives $\&, \vee, \sim, \rightarrow$ and the quantifiers \forall, \exists . A signed formula is any expression of the form $+B$ or $-B$ where B is a formula. If S is a set of signed formulas let

$$S_+ = \{+B \mid +B \in S\}, \quad S_- = \{-B \mid -B \in S\} \quad \text{and}$$

$$D(S) = \{\pm X \mid \mp X \in S\}.$$

Definition. An intuitionistic Kripke model for \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{D} , called a model in the sequel, is a triple (K, R, ϕ) where:

K is a non-empty set,

R is a reflexive and transitive relation on K ,

ϕ is a mapping from K such that for each p, q in K

(1) $\phi(p)$ is a classical model for \mathcal{S}' and \mathcal{D} , \mathcal{S}' a non-empty subset of \mathcal{S}

(2) For each A in \mathcal{D} and for each \underline{a} in \mathcal{S} :

$+A(\underline{a}) \in \phi(p)$ and $pRq \Rightarrow +A(\underline{a}) \in \phi(q)$;

$-A(\underline{a}) \in \phi(p)$ and $pRq \Rightarrow$ either $-A(\underline{a})$ or $+A(\underline{a})$ is in $\phi(q)$.

Definition. Let Γ be a set of (signed) sentences. We say that the (signed) sentence $(\pm)B$ is from Γ if each parameter and atomic predicate letter used in B appears in some sentence of Γ .

Definition. Let (K, R, ϕ) be a model. We want to define by induction a sequence of functions on K , $\phi^{(0)}, \phi^{(1)}, \dots, \phi^{(n)}, \dots$ such that for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and for each p in K $\phi^{(n)}(p)$ contains only signed sentences

from $\Phi(p)$. Let $\Phi^{(0)}(p) = \Phi(p)$ for all p in K . Having defined $\Phi^{(k)}$ such that for each p in K $\Phi^{(k)}(p)$ contains only signed sentences from $\Phi(p)$, then $\Phi^{(k+1)}$ is defined in the following way. For each p in K $\Phi^{(k+1)}(p)$ is the set of signed sentences $\pm B$, B a sentence from $\Phi(p)$, for which one of the following conditions holds:

- (1) $\pm B \in \Phi^{(k)}(p)$, respectively;
- (2) B is $C \& D$ and each of $+C$ and $+D$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(p)$, respectively, one of $-C$ or $-D$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(p)$;
- (3) B is $C \vee D$ and one of $+C$ or $+D$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(p)$, respectively, both $-C$ and $-D$ are in $\Phi^{(k)}(p)$;
- (4) B is $\sim C$ and for each q in K such that pRq , $-C$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(q)$, respectively, there is a q in K such that pRq and $+C$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(q)$;
- (5) B is $C \rightarrow D$ and for each q in K such that pRq one of $-C$ or $+D$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(q)$, respectively, there is a q in K such that pRq and each of $+C$ and $-D$ are in $\Phi^{(k)}(q)$;
- (6) B is $\exists x C(x)$ and $+C(a)$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(p)$ for some sentence $C(a)$ from $\Phi(p)$, respectively, for all sentences $C(a)$ from $\Phi(p)$, $-C(a)$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(p)$;
- (7) B is $\forall x C(x)$ and for all q such that pRq and for all sentences $C(a)$ from $\Phi(q)$ $+C(a)$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(q)$, respectively, there is a q in K such that pRq and for some sentence $C(a)$ from $\Phi(q)$ $-C(a)$ is in $\Phi^{(k)}(q)$.

Finally let for each p in K $\Phi^*(p) = \bigcup_{k \in N} \Phi^{(k)}(p)$.

With this definition, for each p in K $\Phi^*(p)$ contains one and only one of $+B$ and $-B$ for each sentence B from $\Phi(p)$.

Definition. A sentence B is valid in a ~~model~~ model (K, R, Φ) if for each p in K such that $+B$ is from $\Phi(p)$, $+B \in \Phi^*(p)$. A sentence B is valid if it is valid in all models.

Definition. Let $S = \{+X_1, \dots, +X_n, -Y_1, \dots, -Y_m\}$. A model (K, R, Φ) is a countermodel for the set S if there is a p in K such that $-X_i \in \Phi^*(p)$ for each $i \leq n$ and $+Y_j \in \Phi^*(p)$ for each $j \leq m$. When this happens we will say that p refuses S .

Finally we recall the following property of Kripke models: if (K, R, φ) is a model, for any formula X and elements p, q in K if $+X \in \varphi^*(q)$ and pRq then $+X \in \varphi^*(p)$.

We are now ready to introduce our dual tableaux. In table A are shown the reduction rules for intuitionistic Beth tableaux as introduced by Fitting [9], while in table B are the positive intuitionistic tableaux. All proof-theoretical definitions given in Fitting apply with minor changes. In particular we recall that a set S of signed sentences is closed if it contains both $+X$ and $-X$ for some sentence X .

We will write $\vdash_I X$, if some positive beth tableau for $+X$ closes.

$\frac{S, + X \& Y}{S, +X, +Y}$	$\frac{S, - X \& Y}{S, -X \mid S, -Y}$
$\frac{S, + X \vee Y}{S, +X \mid S, +Y}$	$\frac{S, - X \vee Y}{S, -X, -Y}$
$\frac{S, + \sim X}{S, -X}$	$\frac{S, - \sim X}{S_+, +X}$
$\frac{S, + X \rightarrow Y}{S, -X \mid S, +Y}$	$\frac{S, - X \rightarrow Y}{S_+, +X, -Y}$
$\frac{S, * \exists x X(x)}{S, +X(a)} \quad *$	$\frac{S, - \exists x X(x)}{S, -X(a)}$
$\frac{S, + \forall x X(x)}{S, +X(a)}$	$\frac{S, - \forall x X(x)}{S_+, -X(a)} \quad *$

* with the proviso that a does not appear in S or in X .

Table A

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) $\frac{S, + X \& Y}{S, +X \mid S, +Y}$ | 2) $\frac{S, - X \& Y}{S, -X, -Y}$ |
| 3) $\frac{S, + X \vee Y}{S, +X, +Y}$ | 4) $\frac{S, - X \vee Y}{S, -X \mid S, -Y}$ |
| 5) $\frac{S, + \sim X}{S, -X}$ | 6) $\frac{S, - \sim X}{S, +X}$ |
| 7) $\frac{S, + X \rightarrow Y}{S, -X, +Y}$ | 8) $\frac{S, - X \rightarrow Y}{S, +X \mid S, -Y}$ |
| 9) $\frac{S, + \exists x X(x)}{S, +X(a)}$ | 10) $\frac{S, - \exists x X(x)}{S, - X(a)} \quad *$ |
| 11) $\frac{S, + \forall x X(x)}{S, +X(a)} \quad *$ | 12) $\frac{S, - \forall x X(x)}{S, -X(a)}$ |

*with the proviso that a does not appear in S or in X

Table B

3. CORRECTNESS OF POSITIVE INTUITIONISTIC BETH TABLEAUS.

The correctness of Beth intuitionistic tableaux is a straightforward consequence of the following theorem:

Theorem (Fitting [9]). If C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n is a tableau and C_i is realizable, so is C_{i+1} .

In the case of positive Beth tableaux the dual concept of realizability will be the notion of countermodel defined earlier.

Theorem 1. Suppose the set of signed sentences above the line in any of the rules of table B admit a countermodel, then so does the set below the line (or at least one of the sets below the line in the cases of rules B1, B4, B8).

In order to prove the theorem we need the following lemma, whose tedious proof we omit because it parallels exactly the proof of lemma 2.2 of Fitting [9].

Lemma 1. If $\{S, +X(b)\}, (\{S, -X(b)\})$, admits a countermodel and a is a parameter which does not occur in S or in $X(b)$, then $\{S, +X(a)\}, \{S, -X(a)\}$ resp.), admits a countermodel.

Proof of the theorem.

There are twelve cases to consider according to which rule we apply.

B1. Suppose there is a $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ)

which refuses $\{S, +X \& Y\}$. Then $D(S) \subseteq \Phi^*(p)$ and

$-X \& Y \in \Phi^*(p)$, which implies that either $-X$ or $-Y$

is in $\Phi^*(p)$. Therefore either p refuses $\{S, +X\}$ or p refuses $\{S, -X\}$.

B2. If there is a $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ) which

refuses $\{S, -X \& Y\}$, then $D(S) \subseteq \Phi^*(p)$, $+X \& Y \in \Phi^*(p)$

and therefore $+X$ and $+Y$ are both in $\Phi^*(p)$. Hence p refuses $\{S, -X, -Y\}$.

B3 and B4 are proved analogously.

B5. Suppose there is a $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ) which

refuses $\{S, +\neg X\}$. Then $-\neg X$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$, which implies

that there exists a $q \in K$ such that pRq and $+X \in \Phi^*(q)$.

Moreover each signed sentence $-B$ in S is such that

$+B$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$ and hence in $\Phi^*(q)$. Therefore q refuses $\{S, -X\}$.

B6. Suppose there is a $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ) which

refuses $\{S, -\neg X\}$. Then $+\neg X$, and hence $-X$, is in

$\Phi^*(p)$ and $D(S) \subseteq \Phi^*(p)$. Therefore p refuses $\{S, +X\}$.

B7. If some $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ) refuses $\{S, +X \rightarrow Y\}$,

then $-X \rightarrow Y$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$ which implies that there exists

a $q \in K$ such that pRq and both $+X$ and $-Y$ are in

$\Phi^*(q)$. Moreover each $-B$ in S is such that $+B$ is in

$\Phi^*(p)$ and a fortiori in $\Phi^*(q)$. Hence q refuses

$\{S, -X, +Y\}$.

B8. If some $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ) refuses $\{S, -X \rightarrow Y\}$, then $+X \rightarrow Y$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$. Hence either $-X$ or $+Y$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$ which also contains $D(S)$. Hence p refuses either $\{S, +X\}$ or $\{S, -Y\}$.

B9. If some $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ) refuses $\{S, +\exists x X(x)\}$, then $D(S) \subseteq \Phi^*(p)$ and $-\exists x X(x) \in \Phi^*(p)$.

If a is used in $\Phi(p)$, then $-X(a)$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$. Hence p refuses $\{S, +X(a)\}$. Otherwise let c be a parameter used in $\Phi(p)$. Then p refuses $\{S, +X(c)\}$ and a does not appear in S or in $X(c)$; hence the lemma applies.

B10. Let us suppose there is a model (K, R, Φ) and a $p \in K$ which refuses $\{S, -\exists x X(x)\}$. Then $D(S) \subseteq \Phi^*(p)$ and $+\exists x X(x)$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$. Therefore, for some c , $+X(c) \in \Phi^*(p)$ and p refuses $\{S, -X(c)\}$. If $a = c$ we are done; otherwise, since a does not occur in S or $X(c)$, we invoke the lemma.

B11. Suppose there is a $p \in K$ in a model (K, R, Φ) which refuses $\{S, +\forall x X(x)\}$. Then $-\forall x X(x)$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$. Hence there exists a $q \in K$ such that pRq and a parameter c from $\Phi(q)$ such that $-X(c) \in \Phi^*(q)$. Moreover each $-B$ in S is such that $+B \in \Phi^*(p)$; hence $+B$ is in $\Phi^*(q)$ so that q refuses $\{S, +X(c)\}$. If $a = c$ we are done; otherwise we invoke the lemma again since a does not occur in S or $X(c)$.

B12. If some p in a model (K, R, Φ) refuses $\{S, -\forall x X(x)\}$, we have that $D(S) \subseteq \Phi^*(p)$, $+\forall x X(x) \in \Phi^*(p)$. Hence $+X(c)$ is in $\Phi^*(p)$. If a is one of these c we are done; otherwise this implies that a does not appear in S , $X(c)$, while p refuses $\{S, -X(c)\}$. Therefore the lemma applies.

Corollary 1. If $\vdash_I X$, then X is valid.

Proof. By hypothesis there is a closed tableau for $+X$ of the form $C_1 = \{+X\}$, C_2, \dots, C_n ,

where C_n is a configuration all of whose elements are closed sets. Suppose that X is not valid. Then there exists a model (K, R, Φ) with a $p \in K$ which refuses $\{+X\}$. But then by the theorem each C_i and, in particular, C_n must contain at least one set of signed sentences which admits a countermodel. This gives a contradiction since each set of C_n is closed.

4. COMPLETENESS OF POSITIVE INTUITIONISTIC BETH TABLEAUS.

The completeness proof closely parallels the one given by Fitting [9] and derived by Kripke [8]. First we will introduce the notion of a dual Hintikka collection. Then we will show that any dual Hintikka collection admits a countermodel. Finally we will show that if no positive tableau for $+X$ closes, then $+X$ can be extended to a dual Hintikka collection, from which completeness of positive tableaux with respect to Kripke models follows immediately.

If S is a set of signed sentences, let \mathcal{S}_S be the set of all parameters occurring in the formulas of S .

Definition. A dual Hintikka collection is a collection \mathcal{G} of sets of signed sentences such that for any S in \mathcal{G} , no positive tableau for S closes and the following holds:

- 1) if $+X \& Y \in S$ then $+X \in S$ or $+Y \in S$
- 2) if $-X \& Y \in S$ then $-X \in S$ and $-Y \in S$
- 3) if $+X \rightarrow Y \in S$ then $+X \in S$ and $+Y \in S$
- 4) if $-X \rightarrow Y \in S$ then $-X \in S$ or $-Y \in S$
- 5) if $\neg X \in S$ then $+X \in S$
- 6) if $\neg X \in S$ then there is a T in \mathcal{G} such that
 $\mathcal{S}_S \subseteq \mathcal{S}_T$, $S \subseteq T$ and $-X \in T$
- 7) if $\neg X \rightarrow Y \in S$ then $+X \in S$ or $-Y \in S$
- 8) if $+X \rightarrow Y \in S$ then there is a T in \mathcal{G} such that
 $\mathcal{S}_S \subseteq \mathcal{S}_T$, $S \subseteq T$ and $-X \in T$ and $+Y \in T$
- 9) if $+\exists x X(x) \in S$ then for all a in \mathcal{S}_S $+X(a) \in S$

- 10) if $\neg \exists x X(x) \in S$ then for some a in \mathcal{S}_S $\neg X(a) \in S$
 11) if $\neg \forall x X(x) \in S$ then for all a in \mathcal{S}_S $\neg X(a) \in S$
 12) if $\forall x X(x) \in S$ then there is a T in \mathcal{E} such
 that $\mathcal{S}_S \subseteq \mathcal{S}_T$, $S \subseteq T$, and an $a \in \mathcal{S}_T$ such
 that $+X(a) \in T$.

Given any dual Hintikka collection $\mathcal{E} = \{S_p\}_{p \in I}$
 we can define a model (K, R, Φ) as follows. $K = I$;
 R is a reflexive and transitive relation on I
 such that pRq iff $S_p \subseteq S_q$, and $\mathcal{S}_p \subseteq \mathcal{S}_q$;
 and for each p in K $\Phi(p)$ is a classical model from \mathcal{S}_p
 defined by: $+A(a) \in \Phi(p)$ iff $\neg A(a)$ is in S_p for
 each atomic sentence $A(a)$.

Theorem 2. For any dual Hintikka collection
 \mathcal{E} the corresponding model defined above is a counter-
 model for any set S_p in \mathcal{E} . More precisely for any
 $p \in I$: if $\pm X \in S_p$, then $\mp X \in \Phi^*(p)$.

Proof. Since $\Phi^*(p) = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Phi^{(n)}(p)$, it is
 enough to show that for each $p \in I$ and for each
 integer n $S_p \cap \Phi^{(n)}(p)$ is empty.

The assertion is true by definition when
 $n = 0$. Suppose the assertion true for each integer
 $k \leq n$. We now prove it is true for $k = n+1$ by
 assuming the contrary and deriving a contradiction.

Suppose there is a Z which is both in S_p and in
 $\Phi^{(n+1)}(p)$. We have twelve cases to examine according
 to the form of Z .

- (1) Z is $+X \& Y$. Then either $+X$ or $+Y$ is in S_p while
 both of them are in $\Phi^{(n)}(p)$. This contradicts
 the induction hypothesis.

- (2) Z is $\neg X \& Y$. Then both $\neg X$ and $\neg Y$ are in S_p while at least one of them must be in $\phi^{(n)}(p)$, which gives a contradiction.
- (3) and (4) The cases $Z = \pm X \vee Y$ are treated similarly.
- (5) Z is $\neg \neg X$. Since Z is in $\phi^{(n+1)}(p)$, there exists a q such that pRq and $+X \in \phi^{(n)}(q)$. But $\neg \neg X$ is also in S_q , because $S_{p,-} \subseteq S_{q,-}$; hence $+X$ is also in S_q , a contradiction.
- (6) Z is $+\neg X$. Since Z is in S_p , there exists a q such that $S_{p,-} \subseteq S_{q,-}$ and $\neg X$ is in S_q . But by hypothesis, $+\neg X$ is also in $\phi^{(n+1)}(p)$ and pRq ; hence $\neg X$ is in $\phi^{(n)}(q)$, which is impossible.
- (7) Z is $\neg X \rightarrow Y$. Since Z is in $\phi^{(n+1)}(p)$, there is a q such that pRq and $+X$ and $\neg Y$ are in $\phi^{(n)}(q)$. But because $S_{p,-} \subseteq S_{q,-}$, $\neg X \rightarrow Y$ is also in S_q ; that is, either $+X$ or $\neg Y$ is in S_q , a contradiction.
- (8) Z is $+X \rightarrow Y$. Since Z is in S_p , there is a q such that $S_{p,-} \subseteq S_{q,-}$ and both $\neg X$ and $+Y$ are in S_q . But pRq and Z in $\phi^{(n+1)}(p)$ implies Z is also in $\phi^{(n+1)}(q)$ which means that either $\neg X$ or $+Y$ must be in $\phi^{(n)}(q)$, a contradiction.
- (9) Z is $+\exists x X(x)$. Since Z is in S_p , $+X(a)$ is in S_p for all a in \mathcal{U}_S . But, because Z is also in $\phi^{(n+1)}(p)$ there must be some $a \in \mathcal{U}_S$ such that $+X(a)$ is in $\phi^{(n)}(p)$, a contradiction.
- (10) Z is $-\exists x X(x)$. Since Z is in S_p , there must be

an a in \mathcal{S}_p such that $\neg X(a)$ is in S_p . But, because $\neg \exists x X(x)$ is also in $\Phi^{(n+1)}(p)$, then $\neg X(a)$ is in $\Phi^{(n)}(p)$ which is impossible.

(11) Z is $\neg \forall x X(x)$. Since Z is in $\Phi^{(n+1)}(p)$, there is a q such that pRq , and an a in \mathcal{S}_q such that $\neg X(a)$ is in $\Phi^{(n)}(p)$. But Z in S_p implies Z is also in S_q because $S_p \subseteq S_q$; hence $\neg X(a)$ is in S_q which is impossible.

(12) Z is $\forall x X(x)$. Since Z is in S_p , there is a q such that $S_p \subseteq S_q$, $S_p \subseteq S_q$, and $\forall x X(x)$ is in S_q . On the other hand, in view of the relation pRq , the hypothesis that $\forall x X(x)$ is in $\Phi^{(n+1)}(p)$ implies that $\forall x X(x)$ is also in $\Phi^{(n)}(q)$, a contradiction.

Definition. A dual Hintikka element with respect to a set \mathcal{S} of parameters is a set of signed sentences S such that no tableau closes for S , $\mathcal{S}_S \subseteq \mathcal{S}$, and S satisfies conditions 1,2,3,4,5,7,9,10,11 in the definition of a dual Hintikka collection.

Theorem 3. Let S be a set of signed sentences such that no tableau for S closes, and \mathcal{S} a countable set of parameters such that $\mathcal{S}_S \subseteq \mathcal{S}$. Then S can be extended to a dual Hintikka element with respect to \mathcal{S} .

Proof. Let $Z_1, Z_2, \dots, Z_n, \dots$ be an enumeration of all subformulas from S using only parameters from \mathcal{S} . We want to define a sequence of signed sets $S_{i,j}$ for each $i \in \mathbb{N}$ and $0 \leq j \leq i$, such that no closed tableau exists for any of them. Let $S_{0,0} = S$.

Having defined $S_{n-1,n-1}$, let $S_{n,0} = S_{n-1,n-1}$. Now, in order to define $S_{n,k+1}$ given $S_{n,k}$ for $0 \leq k < n$, let us consider Z_k . If neither of $+Z_k$ or $-Z_k$ is in $S_{n,k}$, let $S_{n,k+1} = S_{n,k}$. Otherwise, since $S_{n,k}$ is consistent by hypothesis, at most one of $+Z_k$, $-Z_k$ is in $S_{n,k}$. Again we have to consider all possible cases.

If $+Z_k$ is in $S_{n,k}$ and has the form $+\forall x$, $+X \rightarrow Y$, $+\forall x X(x)$, then $S_{n,k+1} = S_{n,k}$. Otherwise: if Z_k is $X \& Y$ and $-Z_k$ is in $S_{n,k}$, let $S_{n,k+1} = \{S_{n,k}, -X, -Y\}$. Since no tableau closes for $S_{n,k}$ by the induction hypothesis, no tableau can close for $S_{n,k+1}$. If $+Z_k$ is in $S_{n,k}$ let $S_{n,k+1}$ be $\{S_{n,k}, +X\}$ or $\{S_{n,k}, +Y\}$ according to which of the two configurations does not close.

The other propositional cases are treated similarly.

Z_k is $\exists x X(x)$ and $+\exists x X(x)$ is in $S_{n,k}$. Then $S_{n,k+1}$ is obtained by adding $+X(a)$ to $S_{n,k}$ for each parameter a used in S_k . It is clear that no tableau closes for $S_{n,k+1}$ if no tableau closes for $S_{n,k}$. If $-\exists x X(x)$ is in $S_{n,k}$, then since by construction $S_{n,k}$ contains only a finite number of parameters, take from S the first unused parameter a_i and let $S_{n,k+1} = \{S_{n,k}, -X(a_i)\}$. The case Z_k is $-\forall x X(x)$ is treated similarly to the case $+\exists x X(x)$.

It is evident by construction that $T = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} S_{n,n}$ is a dual Hintikka element with respect to \mathcal{S} .

Theorem 4. (Completeness) If X is valid, then $\vdash_I X$.

Proof. We will show the contrapositive, that is if no tableau for $+X$ closes then $\{+X\}$ admits a countermodel and therefore X cannot be valid.

Let $\{\eta_m\}_{m \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a collection of countable sets of parameters such that $\eta_i \cap \eta_j$ is empty for each $i, j \in \mathbb{N}$, η_1 contains all parameters in X and let

$$\mathcal{G}_n = \bigcup_{m=1}^n \eta_m \text{ for each } n \in \mathbb{N}.$$

Let us call a p-sentence any sentence of the type $+\neg Y$, $+Y \rightarrow Z$, $+\forall x Y(x)$. We will now show how to construct a dual Hintikka collection starting with $+X$. Since no tableau for $+X$ closes, extend $\{+X\}$ to a dual Hintikka element with respect to \mathcal{G}_1 . Let S_1 be the set of signed sentences so obtained. Now enumerate all p-formulas of S_1 and take the first one. We then extend one of the sets $\{S_1, -, -X\}$, $\{S_1, -, -X, +Y\}$, and $\{S_1, -, +A(a)\}$ to a dual Hintikka element with respect to \mathcal{G}_2 , note that $a \in \mathcal{G}_2$, according as the first p-formula of S_1 has the form $+\neg X$, $+X \rightarrow Y$ or $+\forall x X(x)$ respectively.

Call S_2 the result of such an extension and consider the p-formula in question "used". Clearly no tableau can close for S_2 if no tableau for S_1 closes. In general at step n we will have the collection $\{S_1, S_2, \dots, S_{2n}\}$ where each S_i is a dual Hintikka element with respect to \mathcal{G}_i . Take the first unused p-formulas appearing in each of these sets and repeat the process above according to the form of the p-formula, obtaining in this way a sequence $\{S_1, S_2, \dots, S_{2n+1}\}$.

It is clear that the collection \mathcal{G} constructed according to this procedure is a dual Hintikka collection. Indeed each element S_i of \mathcal{G} , being a dual Hintikka element with respect to \mathcal{G}_i , must satisfy conditions 1,2,3,4,5,7,9,10,11. Moreover if $\neg X$ is in S_i , for some i , then by construction there must be an S_k in \mathcal{G} such that $S_i \subseteq S_k$, $\mathcal{G}_{S_i} \subseteq \mathcal{G}_{S_k}$ and $\neg X \in S_k$ so that condition 6 is satisfied. If $X \rightarrow Y$ is in S_i there must be an S_k in \mathcal{G} such that $S_i \subseteq S_k$, $\mathcal{G}_{S_i} \subseteq \mathcal{G}_{S_k}$ and both $\neg X$ and Y are in S_k , which takes care of condition 8. Finally condition 12 too is satisfied because if $\forall x X(x) \in S_i$, for some i , then by construction there must be an S_k in \mathcal{G} such that $S_i \subseteq S_k$, $\mathcal{G}_{S_i} \subseteq \mathcal{G}_{S_k}$, and an a in \mathcal{G}_{S_k} such that $X(a) \in S_k$.

Since \mathcal{G} is a dual Hintikka collection, we can apply Theorem 2 and construct the corresponding model. In such a model $\Phi^*(p_1) \cap S_1$ is empty but $X \in S_1$; hence $\neg X \in \Phi^*(p_1)$ and X is not valid.

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