# Minmax and Maxmin 

## ISCI 330 Lecture 8

February 1, 2007

## Lecture Overview

(1) Recap
(2) Maxmin and Minmax

## Computing Mixed Nash Equilibria

- Guess the support
- If a player has a support of size 2 or more, he must be indifferent between these actions
- Set up an equation that expresses these constraints:
- e.g., $u_{1}(B,(p, 1-p))=u_{1}(F,(p, 1-p))$
- Solve the equation to find $p$.


## Lecture Overview

## (1) Recap

(2) Maxmin and Minmax

## Max-Min Strategies

- Player $i$ 's maxmin strategy is a strategy that maximizes $i$ 's worst-case payoff, in the situation where all the other players (whom we denote $-i$ ) happen to play the strategies which cause the greatest harm to $i$.
- The maxmin value (or safety level) of the game for player $i$ is that minimum amount of payoff guaranteed by a maxmin strategy.
- Why would $i$ want to play a maxmin strategy?


## Max-Min Strategies

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- The maxmin value (or safety level) of the game for player $i$ is that minimum amount of payoff guaranteed by a maxmin strategy.
- Why would $i$ want to play a maxmin strategy?
- a conservative agent maximizing worst-case payoff
- a paranoid agent who believes everyone is out to get him


## Definition

The maxmin strategy for player $i$ is $\arg \max _{s_{i}} \min _{s_{-i}} u_{i}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$, and the maxmin value for player $i$ is $\max _{s_{i}} \min _{s_{-i}} u_{i}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$.

## Min-Max Strategies

- Player $i$ 's minmax strategy in a 2-player game is a strategy that minimizes the other player $-i$ 's best-case payoff.
- The minmax value of the 2-player game for player $i$ is that maximum amount of payoff that $-i$ could achieve under $i$ 's minmax strategy.
- Why would $i$ want to play a minmax strategy?


## Min-Max Strategies

- Player i's minmax strategy in a 2-player game is a strategy that minimizes the other player - $i$ 's best-case payoff.
- The minmax value of the 2-player game for player $i$ is that maximum amount of payoff that $-i$ could achieve under $i$ 's minmax strategy.
- Why would $i$ want to play a minmax strategy?
- to punish the other agent as much as possible


## Definition

The maxmin strategy for player $i$ is $\arg \max _{s_{i}} \min _{s_{-i}} u_{i}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$, and the maxmin value for player $i$ is $\max _{s_{i}} \min _{s_{-i}} u_{i}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$.

## Definition

In a two-player game, the minmax strategy for player $i$ is $\arg \min _{s_{i}}$ $\max _{s_{-i}} u_{-i}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$, and the minmax value for player $i$ is $\min _{s_{i}}$ $\max _{s_{-i}} u_{-i}\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$.

## Minmax Theorem

## Theorem (Minmax theorem (von Neumann, 1928))

In any finite, two-player, zero-sum game, in any Nash equilibrium each player receives a payoff that is equal to both his maxmin value and his minmax value.

- The maxmin value for one player is equal to the minmax value for the other player. By convention, the maxmin value for player 1 is called the value of the game.
- For both players, the set of maxmin strategies coincides with the set of minmax strategies.
- Any maxmin strategy profile (or, equivalently, minmax strategy profile) is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, these are all the Nash equilibria. Consequently, all Nash equilibria have the same payoff vector (namely, those in which player 1 gets the value of the game).


## Geometric Representation: Saddle Point



- Can you see why this picture illustrates the maxmin and minmax values?


## How to find maxmin and minmax strategies

Consider maxmin strategies for player $i$ in a 2-player game.

- Notice that $i$ 's maxmin strategy depends only on $i$ 's utilities
- thus changes to $-i$ 's utilities do not change $i$ 's maxmin strategy
- Consider the game where player $i$ has the same utilities as before, but player $-i$ 's utilities are replaced with the negatives of $i$ 's utilities
- this is now a zero-sum game
- Because of the minmax theorem, we know that any Nash equilibrium strategy in this game is also a maxmin strategy
- Thus, find player $i$ 's equilibrium strategy in the new game and we have $i$ 's maxmin strategy in the original game
- We can use a similar approach for minmax.

