Imperfect-Information Extensive Form Games

Week 4

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Week 4, Slide 1

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Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games

• What situations are modeled by these games?

Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games

- What situations are modeled by these games?
- How do we define them?



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- How do we define pure strategies in general?
- What is the induced NF?
- What is the reverse transformation?

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Imperfect-Information Extensive Form Games



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- What is a game of perfect recall?
- What nice properties to such games have?
- Explain what it means to play a game of imperfect recall.
- How can behavioral and mixed strategies be different in such games?

How can we find an equilibrium of an imperfect information extensive form game?

- One idea: convert to normal form, and use techniques described earlier.
 - Problem: exponential blowup in game size.
- Alternative (at least for perfect recall): sequence form
 - for zero-sum games, computing equilibrium is polynomial in the size of the extensive form game
 - exponentially faster than the LP formulation we saw before
 - for general-sum games, can compute equilibrium in time exponential in the size of the extensive form game
 - again, exponentially faster than converting to normal form

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