

3. Let  $B(X)$  be the best woman that man  $X$  is paired with in some stable pairing. We want to show that the proposal algorithm produces the pairing  $(X, B(X))$  for all men  $X$ . (Note: At this point we don't even know that the  $B(X)$  are distinct. For all we know,  $B(X)$  may equal  $B(Y)$  for  $X \neq Y$ .) Let  $G(X)$  be the woman that is paired with man  $X$  by the Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm. Suppose  $G(X) \neq B(X)$ . Woman  $G(X)$  is less preferable to  $X$  than woman  $B(X)$ , thus  $B(X)$  rejected  $X$  during the proposal algorithm. Suppose man  $X$  is the first man rejected by his optimal stable woman during the execution of the proposal algorithm. Let  $Y$  be the man that  $B(X)$  prefers to  $X$  at the time of  $X$ 's rejection. Man  $Y$  has not been rejected by his optimal stable partner,  $B(Y)$ , so he prefers  $B(X)$  to  $B(Y)$  or  $B(Y) = B(X)$ . Now consider a stable pairing  $P$  that contains  $(X, B(X))$ . We know  $B(X)$  prefers  $Y$  to  $X$ , and  $Y$  prefers  $B(X)$  to his partner in  $P$ . ( $Y$  prefers  $B(X)$  to *any* stable partner not equal to  $B(X)$ .) Thus any pairing that contains  $(X, B(X))$  is not stable, contradicting our definition of  $B(X)$  as  $X$ 's optimal stable partner.
5. Run the proposal algorithm with the men doing the proposing. The algorithm will terminate once  $m$  different women receive a proposal, since at that point all the men are paired. (Note that this uses the fact that once a woman is paired, she remains paired during the proposal algorithm.) Since  $m < n$ , no man runs out of women to propose to before this occurs and the stability of the resulting pairing follows as discussed in class.

Let  $G$  be the resulting pairing. Suppose there exists another stable pairing  $P$  such that a woman  $y$  is unpaired in  $P$  and paired in  $G$  to some man  $Y$ . By a similar argument to that given in question 3, man  $Y$  prefers woman  $y$  to any other woman he is paired with in a stable pairing. Thus man  $Y$  prefers woman  $y$  to his partner in  $P$  and woman  $y$  prefers man  $Y$  to being unpaired, so pairing  $P$  is unstable.

6. (from a solution by David Zuckerman) The game ends when the last king is drawn. To find the expected number of cards remaining, consider a circle with 53 items on its perimeter. We select 5 different ones uniformly at random – 4 of these represent the 4 kings and 1 represents where we break open the circle to form a linear ordering of the remaining 52 items. Let  $X_1$  be a random variable describing the distance from the splitting item to the first king (clockwise),  $X_i$  denote the distance from the  $(i - 1)$ st king to the  $i$ th king ( $i = 2, 3, 4$ ), and  $X_5$  the distance from the fourth king to the splitting item. By symmetry,  $E[X_i] = E[X_j]$ . Moreover,  $X_1 + X_2 + X_3 + X_4 + X_5 = 53$ . So  $E[X_i] = 53/5$  for  $i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ . The expected number of cards remaining on the table is  $E[X_5] - 1 = 48/5$ .