



Game Theory Week I

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

A Flipped Classroom Course

Before Tuesday class: Watch the week's videos, on Coursera or locally at UBC. Hand in the previous week's assignment electronically.



Tuesday class: A lecture with high-level review of concepts from the week's videos. Enrichment lectures about concepts not covered online. Discussion, interactive activities.

Thursday class: A "lab" focusing on group work. We'll review the solutions to the previous week's assignment. Then we'll give you the next assignment (usually 1 or 2 questions) and you'll work in groups. Kevin and Dave/James will be there to offer help, hints, and advice about how to improve answers. Before Tuesday's class, watch the first week of videos:



https://www.coursera.org/course/gametheory

http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~cs5321/

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Game Theory Week I

Auction Results

Frank - 10\$ V Alex - 11\$ Juman - 8.25 \$ Yingsai - 5,5 \$ Anupam - 6.25 \$ Samira - 59



Auction Results



the stephen Lewis FOUNDATION	260 Spadina Avenue, Suite 501 Toronto, ON MST 2E4 Phone / Téléphone: 416.533.9292 Tolf fre / Sans frais: 1.888.203.9990 Fax / Télécopieur: 416.850.4910 www.stepheniesfoundation.org	OFFICIAL DONATION RECEIPT FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES REÇU OFFICIEL AUX FINS DE L'IMPÒT
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM: LE PRÉSENT DOCUMENT CONFIRME QUE NOUS AVONS RECU DE LA PART DE:		
Kevin Leyton-Brown 301-1838 Nelson St Vancouver, BC, V6G1N1	Receipt Number / Numéro de reçu: Gift Date / Date de réception du don: Issue Date / Date d'émission du reçu: Issue Location / Lieu d'émission du reçu:	R38086 01/08/2013 01/08/2013 Toronto, ON
	Gift Amount / Montant du don: Advantage Amount / Valeur de l'avantage:	\$46.00 \$0.00
	Receipt Amount / Montant admissible:	\$46.00

THANK YOU FOR YOUR GENEROUS SUPPORT! MERCI DE VOTRE GÉNÉREUX APPUI!

Charitable Business No. / No. d'enregistrement: 89635 4008 RR0001 Canada Revenue Agency / Agence du revenue Canada www.cra-arc.gc.ca/charities

Ilana Landsberg-Lewis Executive Director / Directrice exécutive

TCP Backoff Game

- Should you send your packets using correctly-implemented TCP (which has a "backoff" mechanism) or using a defective implementation (which doesn't)?
 - both use a correct implementation: both get I ms delay
 - one correct, one defective: 4 ms for correct, 0 ms for defective
 - both defective: both get a 3 ms delay.
- Some questions to discuss after playing:
 - What action should a player of the game take?
 - Would all users behave the same in this scenario?
 - What global behavior patterns should a system designer expect?
 - For what changes to the numbers would behavior be the same?
 - What effect would communication have?
 - Repetitions? (finite? infinite?)
 - Does it matter if I believe that my opponent is rational?

Defining Games - The Normal Form

- Finite, *n*-person normal form game: $\langle N, A, u \rangle$:
 - Players: $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ is a finite set of n, indexed by i
 - Action set for player $i A_i$

• $a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in A = A_1 \times \ldots \times A_n$ is an action profile

• Utility function or Payoff function for player $i: u_i : A \mapsto \mathbb{R}$

• $u = (u_1, \ldots, u_n)$, is a profile of utility functions

- Writing a 2-player game as a matrix:
 - "row" player is player I, "column" player is player 2
 - rows correspond to actions $a_1 \in A_1$, columns correspond to actions $a_2 \in A_2$
 - cells listing utility or payoff values for each player: the row player first, then the column



More General Form

Prisoner's dilemma is any game

$$\begin{array}{c|c} C & D \\ \hline \\ C & a,a & b,c \\ \hline \\ D & c,b & d,d \end{array}$$

with c > a > d > b.




Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Matching Pennies

Bayesian Normal-form arctions were Bayesian Normal-form arctions were readed of the common section of the common method of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the common section of the common proton section of the common section of the

One player wants to match; the other wants to mismatch.



Coordination Game



	Left	Right
Left	1,1	0, 0
Right	0, 0	1, 1


Bayestan Kornel-form and actions Bayestan Kornel-form actions the country of the common many state country and actions the country of the common many state country and actions the country of the common state country and actions the country of the common state country and actions the country of the common state country of the country of the common state country of the country o

General Games: Battle of the Sexes



The most interesting games combine elements of cooperation and competition.

в



Keynes Beauty Contest Game: The Stylized Version with the second of the

- Each player names an integer between 1 and 100.
- The player who names the integer closest to two thirds of the *average* integer wins a prize, the other players get nothing.
- Ties are broken uniformly at random.

Best Response



- If you knew what everyone else was going to do, it would be easy to pick your own action
- Let $a_{-i} = \langle a_1, \dots, a_{i-1}, a_{i+1}, \dots, a_n \rangle$.

• now
$$a = (a_{-i}, a_i)$$

Definition (Best response)

 $a_i^* \in BR(a_{-i}) \text{ iff } \forall a_i \in A_i, \ u_i(a_i^*, a_{-i}) \ge u_i(a_i, a_{-i}).$

Nash Equilibrium

- Really, no agent knows what the others will do.
- What can we say about which actions will occur?

• Idea: look for stable action profiles.

Definition (Nash Equilibrium) $a = \langle a_1, \dots, a_n \rangle$ is a ("pure strategy") Nash equilibrium iff $\forall i, a_i \in BR(a_{-i}).$




Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

._____




$$C$$
 D

$$\begin{array}{c|ccc} C & -1, -1 & -4, 0 \\ \hline D & 0, -4 & -3, -3 \end{array}$$















0, 0


1, 2





B 2,1

0, 0



F

Domination

- Buyesian Normal-Ordinaction Canadian Contraction Marker Contract
- Let s_i and s'_i be two strategies for player i, and let S_{-i} be is the set of all possible strategy profiles for the other players
 - What's a "strategy"?
 - For now, just choosing an action ("pure strategy")

Definition

$$s_i$$
 strictly dominates s_i' if $\forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$, $u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i', s_{-i})$

Definition

 s_i very weakly dominates s_i' if $\forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i}, u_i(s_i,s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s_i',s_{-i})$

Pareto Optimality

- When one outcome o is at least as good for every agent as another outcome o', and there is some agent who strictly prefers o to o':
 - it seems reasonable to say that o is better than o'
 - we say that *o* Pareto-dominates *o*'.



An outcome o^* is Pareto-optimal if there is no other outcome that Pareto-dominates it.



Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Pareto Optimality

- When one outcome o is at least as good for every agent as another outcome o', and there is some agent who strictly prefers o to o':
 - it seems reasonable to say that o is better than o'
 - we say that *o* Pareto-dominates *o*'.

Definition (Pareto Optimality)

An outcome o^* is Pareto-optimal if there is no other outcome that Pareto-dominates it.

• can a game have more than one Pareto-optimal outcome?



Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Pareto Optimality

- When one outcome o is at least as good for every agent as another outcome o', and there is some agent who strictly prefers o to o':
 - it seems reasonable to say that o is better than o'
 - we say that *o* Pareto-dominates *o*'.

Definition (Pareto Optimality)

An outcome o^* is Pareto-optimal if there is no other outcome that Pareto-dominates it.


- can a game have more than one Pareto-optimal outcome?
- does every game have at least one Pareto-optimal outcome?




Left Right

Left	1, 1	0, 0
Right	0, 0	1, 1











Bayesian Nemelon actions were Bayesian Nemelon actions were ready of the common Mark could be action and the common ready of t









The paradox of Prisoner's dilemma:

the (DS) Nash equilibrium is the only non-Pareto-optimal outcome!

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Game Theory Week I