

Presented at PETS'2016,  
July 20th 2016



# Beeswax

a platform for private web apps

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# Are they secure? Is it really Private?

## Google Hangouts/GTalk glitch sends chats to wrong recipients

[UPDATE] Be careful what you say or be sent to the wrong person. Google into it.



By [Michael Lee](#) | September 26, 2013 -- 07:28 GMT (00:28 PDT) | Top

Cryptocat 'encrypted' group chats may have been crackable for 7 months

06 JUL 2013

## Sharing Links On Facebook Not As Private As You Might Think

BY DAVID MURPHY | JUNE 11, 2016 02:50PM EST | 0 COMMENTS

*It's not very hard for developers to extract links from Facebook's database, and these links might have sensitive information right in the URL.*


## New message



To: JS x



Has mutual  
Lives in Briti



hi!




Ex: Facebook Messaging, cryptocat, google talk otr.

How could one gain assurance?

- Audit the code?
- Rely on conclusions of a diligent self-identified community of experts?
- Do it again for every app?

# Root of the Problem


- Client-Side code of private apps contains private information – The keys.
- W/O containment of keys, plaintext, crypto functionality, app must be in TCB
- Moreover, *\*every\** app performing end-to-end security must be trusted



# Beeswax

- A security platform to reduce the TCB of private *web* applications.
- Disaggregation, and containment of security-critical data & functionality.
- Sharing of this functionality provided in well-defined APIs.
- Allows scrutiny to be focused on the platform (*Instead of every app*)
- Implemented as a Google Chrome (v40) extension, (5K lines of code)
- Deployable now and allows rich web application development


# TCB Grows Larger



Repeats for each app.

Vulnerabilities in application code can exfiltrate data.

 Must be in TCB




## Protect Keys

- Move them to platform
- Application gets key handles

- Must be in TCB
- Needs no trust





Must be in TCB


Needs no trust

Also protect plaintext

- Provide opaque handles to the application
- Challenges:
  - Keep look n feel
  - Maintain current dev practices.

# Challenge - Isolating plain text

Plaintext isolated in “private areas” taken in charge by Beeswax.




1. API call designates region of DOM to display confidential info.

2. Platform protects region of DOM from access by page JS.\*\*

3. API call to display and inputs ciphertext in/out private area.

\*\*Isolation uses ShadowDOM [W3C], similar to ShadowCrypt [CCS2014].


\*\*We perform JS environment changes to protect access and allow events.



- Beeswax isolates keys and plaintext
- Isolated data cannot be exfiltrated

*Are we done?  
Can we turn the app stacks blue?*

- Must be in TCB
- Needs no trust



NO!

*Blue means we must assume app can be malicious.*

*A malicious app can spoof the UI.*

- Must be in TCB
- Needs no trust

# Challenge – Defeating UI spoofing by app


Application may or may not use Beeswax APIs.

App might try to provide its own “privacy” markers

E.g. “Bob’s in the ‘To:’ field. Is this message really being sent to Bob?”

Application could show “green locks” or “green borders”, but can’t be trusted.

Beeswax could change the page to add indicators, but the app controls the window.



# Beeswax Privacy Indicator


We add an indicator of privacy in an unspoofable region of the tab

User interactions in private areas toggle the privacy indicator.


Tells if DOM region of interest is private

Content is hidden from the app

Events locked\* to region




User kb + mouse  
Interactions



- Keys/plaintext are unavailable to the application
- P.I. indicates where events and text go.
- In TCB: Beeswax YES, Apps: NO

- Must be in TCB
- Needs no trust

# Split Functionality: Platform and App



When interacting with a private area, the platform allows the user to verify true recipients of a message.

Application provides functionality and takes care of sharing.  
Intention: "User wants to write a message to Bob+Carl"

Platform manages keys and identities.

Platform establishes secure end-to-end data streams between users. (crypto).




# Transparent Key Management and Distribution

Beeswax has Built-in key management:

- Automatic distribution of Public Keys
- Key Agreement Protocol between pairs of users (“friendships”)
- Symmetric key crypto API (“streams”)

# Beeswax Identities

At setup, a user's Beeswax browser extension will generate 2 keypairs (sign, encrypt) and post a self signed cert of both to a configured twitter account..



The Beeswax background process in the extension monitors and reposts certs periodically.

\*A similar process allows users to retrieve and monitor friend's keys based on twitter IDs

# Beeswax Key Distribution

The application initiate friendships with other users. (Triggers the KAP).




@bob's certs






Beeswax periodically monitors online certs against those in DB. Handles revocation.\*



Fetch friend @bob's



Beeswax @alice  
(background)



# Key Agreement -- Friendship Channel

Key-Agreement-Protocol (KAP) creates secure bi-directional control channel between pairs of users, **Friendship Channel**. E.g. used for invitations and exchanging key information (see below).

**API `get_friend(@accountid)` -> friendship**

Establishes a set of symmetric keys used for secure communication of app signalling, such as invitations to streams.

# Streams

Streams are media channels. Stream creators can invite other users over friendship channels.

**API invite(<friendship>, <streamid>) -> invitation**

Invite participants to a stream by messages over friendship channel

**API accept\_invite(<invitation>) -> streamid**

Application receives a key handle for this stream (handle to a symmetric key).

Application relays ciphertext attached to streams.

# Evaluation


- Mechanisms fit for the development of modern web application
- Transformed existing web communication application (IRC) to support encrypted messaging between groups of users
- Created new encrypted photo gallery to demonstrate ability to handle richer media types
- Acceptable performance

# Evaluation - Encrypted IRC Client

Adding encrypted messages to an IRC client:

Beeswax users can create encrypted IRC channels

Modified KiwiIRC v0.9.0: 400 LOC added to client-side (7%)



The screenshot shows the Kiwi IRC client window. The title bar reads "Kiwi IRC". The interface includes a channel tab for "#ubuntu" on the "freenode" server. A banner at the top provides links for the Official Ubuntu Support Channel, IRC Guidelines, IRC info, Pastes, Release Notes, and Download. The chat log shows the following messages:

- 19:37:04: Topic for #ubuntu is: Official Ubuntu Support Channel | IRC Guidelines: <http://ubottu.com/y/gl> | IRC info: <http://ubottu.com/y/irc> | Pastes to <http://paste.ubuntu.com/> | Release Notes: <http://ubottu.com/y/rn> | Download: <http://ubottu.com/y/dl> | Currently supported versions 10.04 LTS (server), 12.04 LTS, 12.10, 13.04 and 13.10
- 19:37:04: Topic set by Pici at 17 October 2013, 14:28:50
- 19:37:04: [ChanServ] [#ubuntu] Welcome to #ubuntu! Please read the channel topic. This channel is logged. Use of this channel implies acceptance of terms at <https://wiki.ubuntu.com/IRC/TermsOfService>
- 19:37:13: FiremanEd [ed@75-137-21-139.dhcp.nwnn.ga.charter.com] has joined
- 19:37:16: kostkon has quit
- 19:37:25: thood has quit
- 19:37:26: Kry Thanks for your help

On the right side, a user list is visible with a context menu open over the user "Aaron-". The menu options are: Message, Info, Slap!, and Close.

# Evaluation - Secure photo sharing (PicSure)

Picsure - init\_js5 - Google Chrome

Picsure - init\_js5

order:8000/#/album/V2qUyqVvmvKaMYIN

Apps Markup band Internet of Thing How to make a si

Logged in as init\_js5 Logout

Add Photo Invite: init\_js5 OK

famous cats

collection by: @init\_js5  
viewers: init\_js4

astronaut cat

cursor cat

Regular tools: jquery, bootstrap, node.


Richer media type support: private areas supporting images (Beeswax photo chooser)



# Performance - Microbenchmarks

## Takeaways:

- Encryption cost is predictable, linear with plaintext size.



## Re: runtime

- ~52 ms average page load increase
- 2.5x slower event processing to sanitize events from confidential information in private areas

# Why just the web. What about mobile?

- Android OS does not have an architecture for secure modules to be loaded
- No allocation for an unspoofable area of the screen (privacy indicator)

# Discussion

- Provides protection against exfiltration by the application provider
- Like any platform, features can be added as platform matures
- Key distribution easy and automatic, deployable now.
- Focus scrutiny on platform, not apps

Platform and apps are open source, available on github:

`https://web-priv.github.io/beeswax/`

END OF RIBBON.  
RESERVE SLIDES FOLLOW

# Privacy indicator states



Fig. 2. The Privacy Indicator “unprotected” (left), “protected” due to keyboard events (“K”) in a private area (middle), and showing a security warning (right).

# Other spoofing

Talk about other ways to spoof there?

- Lying about recipients
- Overlaying elements
- Stealing events from private areas
- Locking mechanism

Refer to paper?

# Beeswax Identity Management

Users are registered to a Pub/Sub service

Users verify binding between P/S account ID and person they want to communicate with

Only account owner can post to that account

Picture - init\_js5 - Google Chrome


order:8000/#/album/V2qUyqVvmvKaMYIN

Apps Markup band Internet of Thing

P

Add Photo Invite: init\_js5

## famous cats



astronaut cat ✓ ✕

Privacy Monitor (Clear All Data) (Refresh)

Active Stream: init\_js5:8ce799a74a2bf0aa4e76aa759496ccfb

- audience: @init\_js4 @init\_js5

Alerts:

- No alerts

Active Account: init\_js4 (add new)

- Distribution Status: completed (last ~0 min ago, next in ~10 min)
- Validation Status: completed (last ~10 min ago, next in ~20 min)
- Keys: [Export as Text](#) / [Regenerate](#)
- Pub / Sub: [Post to Twitter](#)

Message Log: (Clear)

Refreshed 0 user key(s).  
New user created successfully.  
Refreshed 0 user key(s).  
changed username to init\_js4  
Refreshed 0 user key(s).  
No keys found on own user profile @init\_js4. Posting.  
Key for @init\_js4 reposted.

Message Input:  
order:8000 (kr: init\_js5 user: init\_js5 serial: 5)