


Math 340, Dec 2

31

Poker Game 2^{52} strategies



Alice's pure strategies
payoffs $\in \mathbb{R}^2$

If Alice plays b of 52 cards


Betty Folds:

$$\frac{b}{52} (+1) + \frac{52-b}{52} (-1)$$

$$\text{Col 2} = 2 \cdot \frac{b}{52} - 1 \quad \text{linear}$$


Col 1: (my mess):

$$-b^2 \text{ (pos const)} + \text{linear}(b)$$



$f(b)$ convex ($f'' \geq 0$)

or




$$f(b) \leq \begin{cases} \left(\frac{b_1-b}{b_1-b_0}\right) f(b_0) \\ + \left(\frac{b-b_0}{b_1-b_0}\right) f(b_1) \end{cases}$$

i.e. $w_0 f(b_0) + (1-w_0) f(b_1)$


Idea:

Look at convex functions (simpler)



Concave functions


(concave down)



together, with weighted average, dominate

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_1(b) & f_2(b) \end{bmatrix}$$

with $b_{min} \leq b \leq b_{max}$



$$f(b) \leq \frac{2}{3} f(b_0) + \frac{1}{3} f(b_1)$$

(say)

So if Betty

col 1 col 2

$$\begin{matrix} b_{min} \\ \rightarrow 0 \\ b \rightarrow 1 \\ \rightarrow 52 \\ b_{max} \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} f_1(b) & f_2(b) \end{bmatrix} \leftarrow b$$


f_1, f_2 convex, then

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_1(b_{min}) & f_2(b_{min}) \end{bmatrix}$$

and

$$\begin{bmatrix} f_1(b_{max}) & f_2(b_{max}) \end{bmatrix}$$

Concave Down is same idea



combo $b=3, b=5$

best

concave

$$\begin{bmatrix} \vdots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \vdots \end{bmatrix}, \text{ col}_2(b) \text{ linear}$$

$$2 \cdot \frac{b}{52} - 1$$

So better to play

$$b = b_{min}, b = b_{max}$$

rather than any other intermediate values of b

$$\begin{matrix} b_{min} \\ \text{dominated} \\ b_{max} \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} - & - \\ - & - \\ - & - \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{matrix} b_{min} \\ b_{max} \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} - & - \\ - & - \end{bmatrix}$$

Old final exams - -

Final 2014 ←

· 2010 ←

· 2009 ←

Final 2014:


5 (g)

Find the value of mixed

strategy for

Alice	Betty	1	4	9	16	25	36	49
1	-1	-4	-9	-16	-25	-36	-49	49
4	-4	-16	-25	-36	-49	36	49	16
9	-9	-25	-36	25	36	49	16	9
16	-16	-36	25	36	49	16	9	4
25	-25	25	36	49	16	9	4	1
36	-36	36	49	16	9	4	1	0
49	-49	49	16	9	4	1	0	0

Payoff to Alice



Claim: $col_1(b) = col_2(b)$
 b integer ☺ , otherwise nearest points...

Betty	Alice	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	49	36	25	16	9	4	1	0
4	36	25	16	9	4	1	0	0
9	25	16	9	4	1	0	0	0
16	16	9	4	1	0	0	0	0
25	9	4	1	0	0	0	0	0
36	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
49	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Payoff to Betty

convex

$b \mapsto b^2$ $b \mapsto (8-b)^2$

Poker:	1	0	1/2
Alice Bluffs	2	1	0
(Bets R/B)			
Alice folds			

$R = b^2$

$S = \begin{cases} b^2 \\ (8-b)^2 \end{cases}$

$$\begin{array}{c} (9 \ 25) \text{ vs } \left(\frac{2}{3}\right) (1 \ 49) \\ \left(\frac{1}{3}\right) (49 \ 1) \\ \hline \left(\frac{51}{3} \ \frac{99}{3}\right) \\ \text{☺} \\ (17 \ 33) \end{array}$$

Extremes best

e.g.

Betty?

$$\begin{array}{c} (9 \ 25) \\ \text{row 3} \\ \leq \left(\frac{2}{3}\right) (1 \ 49) \text{ row 1} \\ + \left(\frac{1}{3}\right) (49 \ 1) \text{ row 7} \end{array}$$

Dec 2014 Final:

1. Mixed strat, value of $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 4 \\ 5 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$

2×2 : gap = Betty Pure - Alice Pure

if gap = 0, values all games or Alice Pure = Betty Pure

$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$ Pure Games = 3

Betty

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{row 1} \\ \text{row 7} \end{array} \begin{bmatrix} (1) & (49) \\ (49) & (1) \end{bmatrix} \text{ gap}$$

$$[x, 1-x] \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 49 \\ 49 & 1 \end{bmatrix} = [v \ v]$$

$$v = \frac{1+49}{2}$$

(Not valid in 3×3 , 3×20)
 4×4 , 5×16 , ...

$$[x, 1-x] \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 4 \\ 5 & 2 \end{bmatrix} = [v \quad v]$$

$$1 \cdot x + 5(1-x) = v = 4x + 2(1-x)$$

Prob 2: Two-phase method

Prob 3: Complementary Slackness

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 4 \\ 5 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{Betty Pure} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 5 \end{bmatrix} \text{ or } \begin{bmatrix} 4 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{Alice: } 5 \quad 4$$

$$\text{Betty Pure: value} = 4$$

$$\text{Alice Pure: value} = 2$$

$$\text{gap} = 4 - 2 \neq 0$$

Mixed game we balance ...